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Abstract
Decisions are made based on available information. A decision support system endeavors
to provide information that is timely, accurate, and trustable. Information gathered from secure
web service transactions has attributes that can be used to assess a level of trustability. The trust
assessments enable a decision maker to determine a basis for confidence in the information pre-
sented from the web service. Existing trust assessment models do not provide a way to determine
from a particular trust assessment what information attributes contributed to its computation.
The present work creates trust values that retain and denote meaning, allowing a decision maker
to see specifically what factors influenced the information trust assessment. Also central to this
work is interpretation of the trust assessments. The interpretation model allows users to spec-
ify the amount of allowable tolerance for reduced trustability in the decision being made. This
"dial-a-trust" allows the interpretation to be scaled relative to the impact of the decision. The trust
assessment values, along with their interpretations, allow both human and machine-based deci-
sion makers to determine whether information is trustable enough for the needs of the decision
being made.
iv
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I. Introduction
The need for timely, accurate, and trusted information is a pervasive force that drives every
decision we make. Accordingly we must be able to ascertain the level with which a given set of
information can be trusted. If we consider the notion that trustability has tangible attributes, then
we suggest that a relative trustability value can be assessed for an information set =. If we restrict
our focus to the communications domain of secure web services, we submit that a relevant set of
indicators can be identified and used to approximate such a value. This research examines how
trustability can be assessed for = in a secure web services environment.
1.1 Background
The concept of ensuring high trustability of information is not a new one. It seems intu-
itive that any organization tasked with critical decision making would be interested exclusively in
information from trusted sources. Distributed computing and web services have enabled infor-
mation to be consolidated from multiple sources, allowing differences in protocols and standards
to be overcome. While this relative independence from specific protocols is a welcome change for
system engineers, a new problem is introduced as information retrieval experts work to ensure
that the picture presented from multiple sources is indeed a trustable one. As noted by others [14],
there are several definitions of trust that have been put forth in literature (see Section 2.2 for a brief
survey of several).
One of the leading definitions of trust has been labeled Information Integrity (I*I) by Martin
Bariff and Salimol Thomas of the Information Integrity Coalition (IIC). I*I is defined as "the
correctness of information, includ[ing] the accuracy, consistency, and reliability of information
domains (content, process, & system) of an enterprise" [13]. Certainly if we are determining
1
the trustability of some information, we must be able to ascertain the measure of its accuracy,
consistency, and reliability. Yet to say that these dimensions paint a complete picture of trustability
is premature. This work proposes additional indicators that give greater insight into how trustable
a particular set of information is.
Given a focus on secure web services, a security framework must be given with which to
provide an environment for trustability evaluation. Until recently, no such framework existed
among the various standards bodies contributing to the field of web services. However, in April
2004 the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) ratified
the Web Services Security (WS-Security) standard. WS-Security proposes "a standard set of SOAP
extensions that can be used when building secure Web services to implement message content
integrity and confidentiality" [9]. This progress was recognized by Gartner Inc. within days of its
ratification, recommending that enterprises should adopt WS-Security for all "across-the-wall Web
service deployments" [26].
1.2 Methodology
Along with defining I*I, Bariff and Thomas propose a framework within which to calculate
the integrity of a given set of information. Using their domains (content, process, and system)
and attributes (accuracy, consistency, and reliability), I*I is calculated by a series of multiplication
functions for each, resulting in a final value between 0 and 1. While providing an easy way
to calculate trustability, the framework does not provide a way to distinguish between two like
values. As demonstrated in Section 2.3.1, the same trust value can be generated from a wide range
of input. One cannot see the contributing factors in the final value, which we believe decreases its
usefulness to the decision making process.
Individual contributing factors should play a role in the decisions made. In order to make
the best decision, insight must be given into the composition of the trust value. If the accuracy
2
attribute is low, then the information probably should not be trusted, and decisions must be made
accordingly. However, if the consistency attribute is suddenly lowered, then a decision needs to
be made whether or not to trust the information; perhaps there are events transpiring that have
resulted in a valid change within the information space. In such a case, we can see that the low
consistency rating is very useful to decision makers because it allows them to focus on areas that
are affecting the trustability.
The notion of domains and attributes is a useful concept, and can be used to gather indicators
used to calculate trust for=. This work proposes a method by which a computed trustability value
carries with it meaningful semantics. Whereas the I*I framework multiplies the indicators to
compute a single composite value eliminating the individual factors, the present work retains
each individual trust indicator that contributes to the overall trust. All trustability indicators are
encoded into a representation in such a way that any value can be decomposed into a meaningful,
repeatable interpretation of how it was derived. In this way we can easily determine what set of
inputs yielded the received trust assessment.
This representation is implemented as an extension to WS-Security web services. As SOAP
services are accessed by a client, trustability indicators are evaluated, and the trust is computed
and stored in a database accessible only to the web service. When data is retrieved by information
consumers, the calculated trust values are retrieved, displayed, and interpreted for the consumer
to determine the basis for confidence in the presented data. Also available is a means with which
to express a level of acceptable tolerance of the computed trust.
1.3 Overview
Having laid a foundation, the remainder of this document presents supporting evidence.
Chapter II outlines the current state of secure web services. Several definitions of trust are presented
and the I*I framework is given in more detail. Chapter III is an expanded methodology, where in-
3
depth coverage is given to calculating, encoding, and interpreting trust values. Chapter IV details
results from a test implementation using a SOAP service secured with WS-Security. Chapter V
presents conclusions and conjectures on trustability as well as possibilities for future work.
4
II. Literature Review
This chapter lays some ground work for pursuing the goals stated in Chapter I. First, the cur-
rent state of secure web services is examined. Second, several definitions of trust are presented
and discussed. Finally, the I*I framework is given in greater detail, along with some example
computations.
2.1 The State of Web Services
The term "web services" is broad in scope, but is generally accepted to be a set of open
standards that enable software applications to be accessed over Internet protocols. There are three
standards that are commonly used: SOAP (formerly known as Simple Object Access Protocol), Web
Services Description Language (WSDL), and Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration
(UDDI). SOAP is the protocol that enables applications to communicate across different platforms.
WSDL is used to describe a particular service and its capabilities, and UDDI allows services to be
advertised and found on the Internet or local networks. The present work focuses exclusively on
SOAP; WSDL and UDDI do not play a role in the trustability assessment methodology presented
in Chapter III.
Since their introduction in 2000, SOAP-based web services have received much attention
across the industry. The lightweight nature of the protocol and openness of the standards used
have made them very appealing to organizations. A quick search of several leading news search
engines for "SOAP web services" in February, 2005 returned several hundred news articles from
each site [10] [11] - clearly web services is a topic that the industry is interested in.
In the February 2004 issue of Communications of the ACM, Conan C. Albrecht states that
"although it was initially designed by Microsoft, UserLand, and Developmentor as a protocol for
the BizTalk architecture, SOAP quickly gained momentum as IBM, Sun, Lotus, CommerceOne, and
other proponents took interest in its development" [12]. The involvement of these industry leaders
5
didn’t stop with the initial SOAP specification; IBM, Microsoft, and Sun are all listed as contributors
to the WS-Security specification [9]. The fact that there are many other organizations involved with
the SOAP and WS-Security specifications and that the specifications have been contributed to the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) are indicators that SOAP is a true emerging standard, not just
the work of a few isolated companies. In 2003 IEEE sponsored the first International Conference
on Web Services, another sign from the industry that web services have grown and continue to
grow in popularity.
As previously mentioned, when SOAP was initially proposed it stood for Simple Object
Access Protocol (the acronym has since been removed from the name). When compared to its
predecessors, it is indeed much simpler in both implementation and use. Unlike other distributed
system protocols, SOAP is not bound to any particular architecture or technology set. Jim Clune
and Dr. Adam Kolawa of Parasoft Corporation point to the Object Management Group’s Internet
Inter-Object Request Broker Protocol (IIOP) being the "underlying transport mechanism used by
the Common Object Resource Broker Architecture (CORBA)" [16]. While IIOP and CORBA may
provide valuable interoperability capabilities, they are tightly coupled, each requiring the other
for implementation and deployment. Freedom from protocol lock-in makes the use of SOAP web
services appealing to organizations that are considering deploying them.
Amit Sheth and John A. Miller from the University of Georgia agree with this idea [25].
From its beginnings CORBA was very complex, requiring experienced developers in order for
it to be useful. Most businesses who used CORBA relied on expensive object request brokers,
making it difficult to start new projects with it. In stark contrast is the web services model, where
the key standards are free. Due to the available choices, in most cases a web services project
can be "developed with essentially no initial technology cost" [25]. While they provide a simple
framework and low cost of entry, web services are also extensible, able to increase in complexity as
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needed to support enhanced functionality. This overall ease of use with a wide range of capabilities
are what has helped SOAP based web services gain industry acceptance as quickly as they have.
2.1.1 The Security Void in SOAP. Despite all the attention being received by web services,
an important aspect that is not addressed within the SOAP specification is security. In the interest
of simplicity and extensibility, features common to most distributed systems were omitted from the
specification. The W3C SOAP specification states that it "does not directly provide any mechanisms
for dealing with access control, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation. Such mechanisms
can be provided as SOAP extensions using the SOAP extensibility model..." [8]. While this focus
on simplicity lends itself to easy development, it also increases the ease of potential compromises.
These potential compromises are highlighted by Clune and Kolawa in [16]. The access ports
that are so easily available for web services use are also potential access points for hackers and
viruses. "Depending on how your software is configured, a remote operator could access your
system and provide instructions to your server" [16]. Obviously this is a situation which should
be avoided at all costs. While it is beneficial to the development cycle to have an open and flexible
system, if not properly secured the ramifications could be detrimental to a web services-based
system.
2.1.2 The Need for SOAP Security. According to David Geer in the October 2003 issue
of Computer, mechanisms that have typically been used for securing web-based communications
do not scale sufficiently for SOAP web services. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) has been the primary
means, using public and private key encryption combined with digital certificates to authenticate
users. Use of SSL has been supplanted by the newer Transport Layer Security (TLS). Geer states
that "TLS provides encryption-based connection security, and lets servers and clients authenticate
one another and determine the cryptographic algorithms and keys that can be used for data
transfer" [17]. While they have provided sufficient security thus far, due to the fact that they must
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decrypt data every time it arrives at an intermediary, and encrypt it before sending it on again,
they do not "scale well to complex, high-volume transactions" [17].
Satoshi Hada and Hiroshi Maruyama of IBM Research agree that layer level security mea-
sures are not sufficient for securing SOAP web services. As an alternative they propose several
arguments in favor of using message layer security [18]: end-to-end security, application indepen-
dence, transport independence, and security of stored messages.
1. End-to-end Security: Because SOAP is not bound to any particular transport protocol, it may
pass through a number of intermediaries between the originator and the destination (see
Figure 2.1). An intermediary must process any SOAP message header entries intended for it,
removing them before forwarding the message. New header entries for other intermediaries
may also be inserted before forwarding. Since the intermediaries have access to the message
for processing, the transmission security provided by SSL and TLS are not sufficient. An
untrusted intermediary could tamper with a message before forwarding it on. A secure
transmission line provides no benefit if untrusted third parties are maliciously handling
messages along the route.
Message Originator Intermediary 1 Intermediary 2 Message Destination
HTTP HTTP HTTP
Message Originator Intermediary 1 Intermediary 2 Message Destination
HTTP Private Line SMTP
Case 1: All connections via HTTP
Case 2: Not all connections via HTTP
Figure 2.1: SOAP transmission with intermediaries [18]
2. Application Independence: Hada and Maruyama claim that in order to achieve true end-
to-end security, it must be implemented at the application level. If there is any point where
messages are transmitted in plain text, it is subject to attack. Integrating cryptographic
functionality into applications is not something that is easily done without compromising
application security. While there are a number of viable cryptographic libraries available,
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their flexibility requires a high level of understanding in order to successfully ensure security.
The authors argue for a "standardized, application-independent security layer" [18] to ensure
adequate protection while removing the need for cryptographic expertise.
3. Transport Independence: Even if we consider all communication links secure, and trust
all intermediaries in Case 2 of Figure 2.1, it is still not adequate to ensure SOAP security.
As previously mentioned, and illustrated in Figure 2.1, intermediaries will often forward
messages using different protocols from that which the message was received on. When
changing protocols, any security information that exists (e.g., authenticity of the message
originator) must be translated to a format that the next protocol can understand. This
process can be tedious and complex, allowing a greater possibility for message tampering.
If the security is handled at the message layer then the number of protocols encountered is
irrelevant, and the need for TLS is isolated to what it is intended for - transmission security.
4. Security of Stored Messages: Were SOAP security to be implemented exclusively at the
transport layer, there would be absolutely no security for messages that are stored after
transactions have completed. In the same way that TLS is irrelevant when an intermediary
dismantles messages for header information, when a message arrives at its final destination
TLS no longer plays a role in the security of the message. In a situation where data is never
stored at all this would not be an issue. However, in many situations messages are logged
for analysis and auditing. This area of concern is of particular interest to this work, as
it evaluates messages for their trustability. Message level security ensures the security of
messages regardless of their current state (in transit or stored).
In the January 2004 issue of BT Technology Journal, Kearney et al [20] also favor message level
security over transport layer security for securing SOAP messages. Consistent with other evalua-
tions of TLS, they agree that it provides good security during message transmission. "However, it
conveys nothing about any processing done at either end of the connection" [20]. Dispelling the
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idea that intermediaries won’t be used in practice, they point out that the "SOAP specifications
clearly envisage the possibility of SOAP networks rather than just point-to-point connections" [20].
According to the specification, a node involved in a SOAP transaction may be one of three things:
the sender, the receiver, or an intermediary. This allows the possibility for applications at either
end of an SSL connection to act as intermediaries, forwarding messages to unknown, non-secure
locations. Except in the simplest of situations, the authors recommend message level security to
combat these issues.
One of the purported benefits of SOAP is its ability to penetrate through and be accessed
from behind firewalls. Because it is text based and often accessed via HTTP, port 80 is commonly
used. Since web servers utilize port 80 for their traffic, developers can count on it being open on
any firewalls their SOAP traffic may encounter. While this ease of access is enticing, it is also a
potential trouble area. Most web traffic results in a human-readable page that is fairly harmless,
but as Kearney et al remind us, "a SOAP message is designed to trigger some activity in the system
receiving it, and this is open to abuse as well as legitimate use" [20].
This is a recurring theme throughout the literature that is perhaps most vehemently argued by
industry leading security expert Bruce Schneier. In the June 15, 2000 issue of his monthly Crypto-
Gram Newsletter, he laments the arrival of SOAP. Because there is no security standard built into
the SOAP spec, he states: "It’s a pretty simple bet that different people will bungle any embedded
security in different ways, leading to different holes on different implementations. SOAP is going
to open up a whole new avenue for security vulnerabilities" [24]. While it’s easy to see that firewall
holes don’t enhance security, Schneier seems a bit extreme with his final proclamation on the issue,
saying "protocols that sneak ... through [firewalls] are not what’s wanted" [24].
Albrecht takes a slightly different stance on this issue, merely raising the point that "as it
becomes more ubiquitous, SOAP may increasingly find itself in the sights of security personnel"
[12]. He encourages organizations to find their own balance between security and functionality.
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The most strenuous security plan allows minimal traffic into the organization, limiting overall
functionality. At the other end of the spectrum are firewalls that allow multiple port ranges and/or
protocols into the internal network to give expected functionality to applications. In his eyes,
SOAP is a possible solution to retaining security while allowing functionality. No additional ports
are required to be opened if the organization is using port 80 for their web servers already, and
SOAP applications are able to tunnel through firewalls as needed.
He cautions against blindly proceeding with this type of configuration though, warning that
soon "network security administrators may see it as an ’end run’ around security" [12]. Since
SOAP traffic has its own unique content type, Albrecht advises that firewalls can be configured to
monitor traffic for specific SOAP methods being invoked as well as other functionality. While not
commonly used in current SOAP applications, filtering is bound to become more common as the
number of SOAP applications increase. Albrecht believes firewall content filtering has the potential
to "undermine one of SOAP’s primary benefits" [12] of being able to pass through firewalls. He
concludes with no solid fix to the problem, in essence concurring with Geer, Hada and Maruyama,
and Kearney et al that something new is needed to realistically secure SOAP messages and allow
expected functionality.
2.1.3 Securing Web Services. With all the warnings about the lack of security in SOAP
web services, there is much work afoot within the industry to remedy the problem. According to
Kearney et al, "there are several standards bodies active in this space, notably W3C and OASIS"
[20]. They discuss five of the more significant initiatives: the WS-X series of specifications, W3C
activities, OASIS, the Liberty Alliance, and the Web Services Interoperability (WS-I) organization.
1. WS-X series of specifications: This is a family of specifications put forth by IBM, Microsoft,
and others in conjunction with the Global XML Web Services Architecture. There are seven
specifications proposed: WS-Security, WS-Trust, WS-Security Policy, WS-SecureConversation,
WS-Federation, WS-Privacy, and WS-Authorization. WS-Security is the foundational layer
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for the other specifications. Despite what the name may imply, it is not an attempt to secure
all aspects of web services. Rather, "it is a building block that is intended to be used in con-
junction with other Web Services and application-specific protocols to accommodate a wide
variety of security models" [20]. Figure 2.2 (from the IBM and Microsoft roadmap) gives
a pictorial representation of how the different specifications fit together and their progress
to-date. Although their scope is broad, Kearney et al are quick to point out that the WS-X
series are "still relatively immature, and it remains to be seen to what extent they are taken
up in practice" [20].
WS-
SecureConversation
WS-Federation WS-Authorization
WS-Policy WS-Trust WS-Privacy
WS-Security
SOAP Foundation
Today
Figure 2.2: Web Services Security Specifications [19]
2. W3C activities: W3C has tended to serve as the focal point for fundamental web services
standards (e.g. SOAP and WSDL). Several key standards currently supported are XML En-
cryption, XML Signature, and XML Key Management. Under the WS-Security specification,
security metadata similar to what is found in XML Encryption and XML Signature are at-
tached to SOAP header messages [17]. Another key contribution of W3C is the Semantic
Web and Web Ontology Working Group. "Although defining and interpreting semantics
has received little attention in current Web Services applications, it will become vital as Web
Services networks become larger and more complex" [20].
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3. OASIS: There are several technical committees (TCs) of importance that have come out of
OASIS. Of particular interest to this work is the WS-Security TC which was established in
order to further develop and promote the WS-Security specification as an industry wide
standard.
4. Liberty Alliance: Formed in September 2001, the goal of the Liberty Alliance Project is
to "develop open standards for federated network identity management and identity-based
services" [20]. Its origins came as a response to Passport, the identity management technology
from Microsoft. There are many attractive features contained within the project. Additionally
there are areas of "overlap and ’competition’ between the WS-X security specifications" [20]
and the Liberty Project.
5. WS-I organization: Differing slightly from the other standards mentioned, the goal of WS-I
is to promote web service interoperability by defining profiles to illustrate how to apply web
service standards. WS-I Basic is the initial profile which covers XML Schema 1.0, SOAP
1.1, WSDL 1.1, and UDDI 2.0. It has recently formed a Basic Security group, examining
the "use of HTTPS, SOAP attachment security, and the OASIS WSSTC specifications (i.e.
WS-Security)" [20].
2.2 Definitions of Trust
Within the literature many definitions of trust are available, all with their own connotations of
what it means to trust some set of information. Generally speaking, there are two broad categories
of trust defined. There is the field of thought which aligns the definition with that from the field
of data quality. In other words, trust is a function of the quality of the data. The alternative field
of thought has its roots in cryptography, answering the question: "how sure can I be that this
data has not been tampered with"? Also presented here is a concept termed The Trust Management
Philosophy, an approach that blends quality-based trust with cryptographic-based trust.
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2.2.1 Quality-Based Trust. Definitions of quality based trust vary depending on which
body or organization is defining them. Despite the variances, there is a common ground among
them that we will focus on. Madhavan K. Nayar from the IIC, Peter Chen of Louisiana State
University, and Pipino et al provide several definitions that we examine here.
According to Nayar, while Information Integrity (I*I) is not explicitly data quality, it is
"directly concerned with the accuracy, consistency, and reliability of information with its supporting
processes and system" [22] (emphasis added). These attributes bring important contributions to
the trust determination process. Each can be applied in the domains of content, process, and system.
The I*I framework defines a methodology by which the attributes can be evaluated in an objective
manner. Using this methodology, the attributes and domains determine the "trustworthiness or
dependability of information" [22]. The I*I framework is given in more detail in Section 2.3.
In the April 2002 issue of Communications of the ACM, Pipino et al discuss a number of data
quality dimensions set in two categories, "... subjective perceptions of the individuals involved
with the data, and the objective measurements based on the data set in question" [23]. Perhaps the
most relevant to our discussion of trust is the dimension of believability, "the extent to which data
is regarded as true and credible" [23]. Incorporated in its measurement is individual assessments
of source credibility, comparison of data to accepted standards, and previous experiences. The
complete list of dimensions and their definitions is shown in Table 2.1.
Chen also has an important contribution to the definition of quality based trust. He terms
calculating trustability as an Information Validity Assessment, composed of three factors: reliability
of the database hardware and software, freshness of the data, and believability of the data [15].
Database reliability and data believability overlap in their definitions, both having to do with the
source of the data and its reliability and believability. The impact of data freshness is important;
data that has outlived its shelf life should be trusted less than data that is considered fresh and up
to date.
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Table 2.1: Data Quality Dimensions [23]
Dimensions Definitions
Accessibility the extent to which data is available, or easily and quickly
retrievable
Appropriate
Amount of Data
the extent to which the volume of data is appropriate for the
task at hand
Believability the extent to which data is regarded as true and credible
Completeness the extent to which data is not missing and is of sufficient
breadth and depth for the task at hand
Concise Represen-
tation
the extent to which data is compactly represented
Consistent Repre-
sentation
the extent to which data is presented in the same format
Ease of Manipula-
tion
the extent to which data is easy to manipulate and apply to
different tasks
Free-of-Error the extent to which data is correct and reliable
Interpretability the extent to which data is in appropriate languages, sym-
bols, and units, and the definitions are clear
Objectivity the extent to which data is unbiased, unprejudiced, and im-
partial
Relevancy the extent to which data is applicable and helpful for the task
at hand
Reputation the extent to which data is highly regarded in terms of its
source or content
Security the extent to which access to data is restricted appropriately
to maintain its security
Timeliness the extent to which the data is sufficiently up-to-date for the
task of hand
Understandability the extent to which data is easily comprehended
Value-Added the extent to which data is beneficial and provides advan-
tages from its use
2.2.2 Cryptographic-Based Trust. Cryptographic trust is seen in everyday browsing of
the World Wide Web (WWW), as secure browser traffic is encrypted and transmitted via SSL.
Technology is used to give users a reasonable assurance that data they have entered is safe from
prying eyes. SSL is also serves as a guarantee to the user that the site they are visiting is really the
site it purports to be. Kearney et al propose that cryptography serves three purposes: to maintain
confidentiality, to provide a means of authentication, and to provide a means of verifying integrity
for a piece of information [20].
Confidentiality prevents those without a private key from accessing the information, allowing
only intended recipients to view the information. Authentication also requires a private key to
gain access, and is combined with the integrity verification in a digital signature. The signature
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"provides a means of detecting whether the document has been altered" [20]. Vital to this concept
is that an information recipient must be able to reliably determine whether the signature certificate
key is correct. This assurance is provided by signing the key and can be done one of two ways.
Kearney et al state: "the certificate can be ’self-signed’, in which case it offers little assurance about
the ’true’ identity of its owner, but can still be useful in checking that one is still ’talking to the same
person as before’. Alternatively it can be signed by an ’authority’. In this case, the confidence in the
identity information given in the certificate depends on the trust that can be placed in the authority
and the processes that authority uses to validate information before issuing a certificate" [20].
2.2.3 The Trust Management Philosophy. In their article from the Summer 1997 issue of
World Wide Web Journal, Rohit Khare and Adam Rifkin present the idea that to focus exclusively
on cryptographic means of security is too narrow of a focus [21]. They present several scenarios
and demonstrate that there are several unknowns despite the cryptographic protections afforded
to users. Consider the situation where a customer connects to her banks’ website and initiates a
payment to her landlord. The bank then has to decide if they should indeed transfer the money
from the customer to the landlord. Even if we make the assumption that the transaction had
appropriate cryptographic protections enforced, there are many details that are still not known.
For example, "nothing in the online encryption handshake necessarily establishes [the customers]
identity, no recoverable signed document exists as a receipt for the transaction, [and] no verification
exists that the landlord toted up the rent correctly" [21]. The answers to these and other questions
cannot be found in the cryptographic realm; additional measures must be put in place to ensure
complete trustability.
There are three basic principles that drive the Trust Management philosophy: be specific, trust
no one but yourself, and be careful. While seemingly obvious, being specific equates to leaving no
detail untouched. In our banking example it is not enough for the customer and bank to agree to
trust each other; minute details are required. If a direct deposit is set up with a bank, there is an
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agreement that "specifies precisely the account into which the employer will forward funds, the
times payment will be made, and the expected bank recourse in cases of error" [21]. Once this
agreement is in place, both the customer and bank can safely agree to trust one another within the
bounds of the specified contract, but transactions outside the bounds of the agreement should not
be trusted.
While it sounds exclusionary in nature, the principle of trust no one but yourself works in
the opposite manner. Its basic tenet is that "any trust decision should logically be derived from
the axioms you yourself believe" [21]. Considering the example of believing that your credit card
number is 1234, one works backwards until a chain of trust is established. What you really know,
is that 1234 is the credit card number that a credit company issued you, and you believe that they
are a valid credit company because your bank says so, and you trust your bank because its public
key is the same one they presented when you initially opened your account with them. At that
point it can safely be said that your credit card number is indeed 1234.
Despite the best intentions and with the best security mechanisms in place, one must always
remember to be careful. There is no scientific methodology associated with this principle, it is
merely a calling to verify and logically prove every decision made, taking time to fully study the
ramifications of a decision. One slip-up is all that is needed to defeat even the most rigorous
security methodology. System designs must be scrutinized at every step of the way, then checked
and rechecked to ensure that no trustability compromises have been introduced.
2.3 I*I Framework
As a reminder to the reader, I*I is defined as "the correctness of information, includ[ing] the
accuracy, consistency, and reliability of information domains (content, process, & system) of an
enterprise" [13]. To that end it defines three domains: content, system, and process. Each domain
contains three attributes: accuracy, consistency, and reliability. Together the domains and their
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attributes are used to calculate an overall value for the I*I of a particular set of information. The
content domain is the set of actual data provided to users for consumption. Content can come
in many forms including text, graphics, audio, or video. The process domain provides a set of
functions that transform an input into a specified output. Finally, the system domain is the set
of components (both physical and logical) that are configured for a certain purpose. Examples
of a system include computer applications as well as business organizational units. Figure 2.3
illustrates the domains with their attributes.
Content
C
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Accuracy
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Content
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Figure 2.3: Information Integrity Domains [22]
When considering the attributes, Nayar states that in general they "apply to each of the do-
mains ... and can be objectively evaluated and measured" [22]. Accuracy is assessed by comparing
data to an established standard and setting an allowable tolerance of deviations from the standard.
If information falls within that tolerance, then it is considered accurate. Consistency is evaluated
from repetitive instances of the same data occurring "in space, over time, and in relation to one
another at the same point in time" [22]. It is expected that the same inputs, assumptions, and
conditions will produce the same results time after time. When this does not happen, confidence
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in the information is lowered. Reliability is determined by comparing the completeness of infor-
mation "when compared to a given specification; by assessing its currency or relative newness;
and by establishing its verifiability" [22]. Each attribute with its respective elements is shown in
Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: The Attributes of I*I With Respective Elements [22]
Accuracy Consistency Reliability
Standards Spatial Completeness
Tolerance Temporal Currency
Relational Verifiability
With the domains and attributes defined, the I*I Framework proposes a set of formulae with
which to calculate the I*I for a given set of information. Each domain uses its own formula, and
the results from each domain are multiplied together for a final result. The input values for each
domain formula are between 0 and 1. Letting Ax represent the attribute accuracy for each domain
x, Cx represent the attribute consistency for each domain x, and Rx the attribute reliability for each
domain x, the individual formulae are shown in the following equations, with the final I*I formula
being given in Equation 2.4.
I*IContent = AC × CC × RC (2.1)
I*IProcess = AP × CP × RP (2.2)
I*ISystem = AS × CS × RS (2.3)
I*I= = I*IContent × I*IProcess × I*ISystem (2.4)
2.3.1 Example Computations. Using these equations, we can devise a multitude of ways
to arrive at the same value for I*I=, as demonstrated in Table 2.3. The shaded cells denote input
values that deviate from 1.00. This leaves one of two possibilities: either we accept the ambiguity
of the final value by itself and hope that it will be enough to guide our decision making process,
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or we can retain the complete set of inputs that generated the value. The I*I framework does not
provide an easy way to retain granular meaning for a particular trust value, nor does it provide
any way to reconstruct a value without the original set of inputs.
Table 2.3: I*I Framework Example Computations
Attributes Accuracy Consistency Reliability TOTAL
Domains:
Content 1.00 0.20 1.00 0.20
Process 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.70
System 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TOTAL 1.00 0.20 0.70 0.14
Attributes Accuracy Consistency Reliability TOTAL
Domains:
Content 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Process 0.45 1.00 0.40 0.18
System 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.80
TOTAL 0.36 1.00 0.40 0.14
Attributes Accuracy Consistency Reliability TOTAL
Domains:
Content 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.14
Process 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
System 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 0.14 0.14
Attributes Accuracy Consistency Reliability TOTAL
Domains:
Content 0.80 0.90 0.86 0.62
Process 0.43 0.97 0.96 0.40
System 0.89 0.67 0.95 0.57
TOTAL 0.31 0.58 0.78 0.14
2.4 Summary
This chapter has discussed the current state of SOAP web services, addressing the security
void as well as current proposals to implement security. Two types of trust: 1) data quality
trust, and 2) cryptographic trust were discussed, as well as the Trust Management Philosophy
which borrows concepts from both types of trust. Finally, the I*I Framework was described in
detail, culminating in the equations for determining I*I for a given set of information. Example
computations were given to demonstrate a potential weakness of the framework. All of this sets
the stage for the next chapter, where the proposed trustability assessment model is given in full
detail.
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III. Methodology
Many of the concepts outlined in Section 1.2 are given in detail within this chapter. Discussion
is first given on how trustability of information should be represented. Second, a realistic, useful
set of indicators are defined with which to determine trustability. Each indicator is comprised of a
set of attributes, which are laid out next. Once the trust has been calculated, it is encoded, giving
consideration to previous discussion on trustability representation. Key to the usefulness of trust
values is their interpretation, and discussion is given to this. Finally, everything is framed within a
web services context, setting the stage for an implementation using the WS-Security specification.
3.1 Overview
Figure 3.1 provides a birds-eye view of the methodology. Each transaction that occurs in
the web service results in calculating a trust assessment of the information from the transaction.
The trust assessments are stored in a transaction log as hexadecimal values for later interpretation.
The trust value of CFAE10 in the figure is an example of a calculated trust assessment. When the
decision maker requests information from the web service, the trust assessments are presented
along with the data. Each assessment is interpreted, or translated, to a decimal percentage and
displayed with color coding as explained in Section 3.2. Users are given the opportunity to adjust
the amount of tolerance for reduced trustability, allowing for the best interpretation for the decision
being made.
3.2 Representation Considerations
An overall goal of an information retrieval system should be to present relevant, useful data
to decision makers. Accordingly, it follows that any representation of trust for a given data set
should be presented in a relevant, useful manner that lends itself to the decision making process.
Intuitively this implies that a simple pass or fail model is not adequate. We are looking for degrees
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Figure 3.1: Information cycle in the secure web services environment
of trustability that a decision maker can combine with their human intelligence and personal
experiences to make the best decision. While a pass/fail model is not adequate, the proposed
model is still comprised of a discrete set of values, providing other systems the ability make
decisions based on the trustability of information.
Along with the actual representation of trust, it is important to discuss when in the informa-
tion flow process the trust data is presented to users. For the sake of this work, we will consider
our environment in two modes: a data generating mode and a data retrieving mode, which are
illustrated in Figure 3.1. The data generating mode operates in a continuous cycle, regardless of
any activity in the data retrieval mode. Trust values are calculated and stored in this mode as
services are accessed, with various indicators giving visibility into the trustability of information
available in this mode. Trust calculation involves harvesting each indicator value and building a
composite assessment value that is stored for later interpretation. Each assessment value is stored
in a cumulative transaction log that can be later mined for historical trends.
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The data retrieval mode is a read-only environment used as needed by the decision maker.
When information is requested, the previously calculated trust values are also retrieved and their
interpretations are displayed along side of the requested data. Trust interpretations are presented
as a roll-up of indicator trust values with the composite assessment being conveyed visually with
color coding. The color display is divided into three user defined categories from low to high
represented by red, yellow, and green respectively. Individual indicators are also presented with
this visual aid to alert users if any specific indicators have significantly affected the trust value.
Users are able to obtain detailed values for each indicator to see why a particular value was
assigned, allowing the best decision to be made for the situation at hand. Also presented is the
ability to make adjustments to the amount of tolerance allowed (see Section 3.5.1 for a detailed
discussion of allowable tolerance), resulting in altered interpretations specific to the decision being
made.
3.3 Indicator Definitions
For the purposes of this work, trustability indicators must be able to be readily gathered from
a secure web services environment. Recognizing that this represents but a subset of all possible
indicators that can be used to determine trustability, our focus is limited to that pertaining to
web services. Indicators are either directly gathered from the WS-Security framework, or are able
to be easily determined from the information system as a whole. Nebulous indicators requiring
subjective input have not been considered for this work. Six indicators have been identified
and are outlined and described in the following sections. They are WS-Security Authorization,
WS-Security Signature, WS-Signature Encryption, Data Consistency, Source Credibility, and Data
Currency.
3.3.1 WS-Security Authorization. This indicator is the first of three from the WS-Security
family. These are among the most pivotal indicators, as they deal with the security of the infor-
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mation system. Information retrieved from an unsecured system should not be trusted because
there are no assurances as to who or what has had access to the data. Vital to our determination
of trustability is a secure system, one where we know and trust anyone who has read or modified
any data. In addition, we need to know if they accessed the system in a manner that will not
compromise its security.
WS-Security Authorization measures whether or not users accessing the system are autho-
rized. In the event that an unauthorized user is able to gain access to the system, they could conduct
any one of a number of malicious actions. Data values could be altered or deleted, information
about non-existent entities could be entered, or they could simply access information intended
only for internal use. In any of these cases this indicator would lower the trust value. However,
access by authorized users is assumed to be trusted for the purposes of this indicator, and would
result in a higher trust value.
3.3.2 WS-Security Signature. Assuming a user is authorized to access the information
system, they must provide some guarantee that their identity is valid. Signature mechanisms
provide these assurances, and this indicator gauges the process and mechanisms used. If the
message was properly signed with authorized keys, then the indicator raises the trust value.
Conversely, an incorrectly signed or unsigned message lowers the trust value.
3.3.3 WS-Security Encryption. Given that a user is authorized, and has signed the message
asserting that they are really the ones accessing the service, the next item of concern is whether or
not anyone else is able to see the message traffic. Message level encryption provides an assurance
that the contents of the message are viewable only to the intended recipients. This indicator is a
measure of whether or not encryption was properly and securely applied to message traffic. A
message that has had encryption correctly applied raises the trust value, whereas one with missing
or incorrect encryption results in lowering the trust value.
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3.3.4 Data Consistency. Figure 3.1 illustrates an environment that exists with multiple
instances, all intended to provide the same information to different users at different locations. In
this case, it is useful to know whether data being retrieved from a particular instance exists within
other instances. Data consistency is the measure of data retrieved compared to similar data that
exists in alternate sources. Whether similar data exists in one, many, or no alternate sources is
reflected in the trust value. Obviously the more sources that contain similar data, the higher the
trust value, whereas fewer or no alternate sources result in a lower trust value.
3.3.5 Source Credibility. Consistent with the notion of multiple sources providing the data,
each source has a reputation associated with how accurate and trustable their information is. If a
particular source has a reputation for providing inaccurate information, then future transactions
will result in a lower trust value. However a source that is considered to be highly accurate and
consistent will result in a higher trust value.
3.3.6 Data Currency. Information often has a certain life expectancy, after which is
considered to be stale, or outdated. Decisions made based on stale data could have adverse effects
on the mission at hand. The goal of this indicator is not to eliminate stale data from entering
the system, but rather alert decision makers to its presence and lower the information trustability.
Data that is as current as or newer than the expected currency for its data type will raise the trust,
whereas data that is older will lower it.
3.4 Indicator Encoding and Calculation Scheme
In order to store these indicators a model must be devised in which granular meaning can be
retained. While the Information Integrity framework discussed in Chapter II stores trust as decimal
values, this model attempts to build and retain reconstructible trust values. We can conveniently
have each indicator attribute represented by one bit in a binary system, resulting in a four-bit
representation for each indicator trust value. To make manipulation of the values easier, we then
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convert each binary value into a hexadecimal value, leaving us with a single digit representing
trust for each indicator. With six indicators, the entire trust value is represented as a six digit
hexadecimal number. Given the same set of inputs, this number can be precisely reconstructed
over and over again. Similarly it can be reverse engineered every time to determine what set of
inputs resulted in its final value.
Figure 3.2 illustrates a trust value and how it is deconstructed and parsed. The entire
assessment is represented as DD7F63, one digit for each indicator. Each indicator value can be
parsed as a binary value, illustrated with the first digit of Dwhich is represented as 1101 in binary.
As discussed in the following sections, attribute bits are paired together when the trust value is
parsed for meaning. For now it is enough to say that the first two bits of 11 represent an unflawed
attribute. The last two bits of 01 represent the assessment impact bounds discussed in Section 3.4.1,
interpreted as a medium-narrow impact bracket. Contribution of the attribute and impact bracket
values to the overall interpretation are discussed in Section 3.5.2. As is discussed in Section 3.4.1,
the Data Currency indicator is represented without bracket preferences. Parsing a Data Currency
indicator results in two attribute groups, the first representing the actual currency of data, and the
second representing the expected currency of data. This is discussed with more detail in Section
3.4.5.
D D 7 F 6 3Hexadecimal Trust Value:
1 1 0 1Binary Indicator Values:
Unflawed attributes Medium-narrow bracket
Figure 3.2: Example of indicator encoding
The fact that we have a reconstructible value is critical; it enables us to retain the complete
impact of the calculated trust . As an example, consider an indicator with a binary value of 1101,
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or D when converted to hexadecimal. Of its four attributes, the first two and last one are positive,
while the third attribute/bit is negative. Without knowing specifically what the attributes for this
indicator are, we can see that the third attribute is lowering the trust in some way. Personal
experience and intelligence of the decision maker comes into play here, they can make appropriate
decisions now knowing why the trust has been lowered. Due to the methodical nature of trust
calculation, the same situation will always result in this value, and likewise this value will always
correspond to the same situation.
3.4.1 Indicator Bracketing. For all indicators except Data Currency, an indicator bracket is
part of the trust value. The bracket is used when interpreting the trust; the wider the bracket the
broader the range of possible scores a given indicator can contribute to the overall interpretation.
Represented with two bits, the brackets range from low to high as shown in Table 3.1 and are
specified by the user. Assignment and representation of the brackets are straightforward, but
interpretation requires further discussion given in Section 3.5.2.1.
Table 3.1: Attribute bracketing scale
Bracket Meaning
00 Narrow range
01 Medium-narrow range
10 Medium-wide range
11 Wide range
3.4.2 WS-Security Indicators. The encoding for each of the three WS-Security indicators
(Authorization, Signature, and Encryption) is identical. These indicators capture whether the WS-
Security components were successfully applied or not. This obviously requires only one bit, but
in keeping with the four bit representation of other indicators, a leading zero is prepended to the
trust value. Thus each WS-Security indicator receives a two bit representation to denote whether
it was successfully applied or not. Incorporating the predefined two bit bracket scheme results in
a four bit representation.
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3.4.3 Data Consistency. When a web service transaction takes place, the transaction data
is compared to similar data in alternate web service sources. It is assumed that the identification
tags are unique for each element of data, and that each source stores a replicate of the data in the
same format with the same record fields. If a record exists for an aircraft with the ID equal to a3
with fields model and status, then any source that contains data about an aircraft a3 is referring
to the same aircraft data, with fields model and status. Each alternate source either contains a
record for aircraft a3 or it doesn’t. If it does, then the details of the record are compared to that
of the primary source. In the general case, a complete match between the primary and alternate
sources means that the data is consistent between the two and will yield a high trust value. An
incomplete match or non-existent record means that the data is not able to be verified as consistent,
which will lower the trust value. The present work examines two alternate sources, although the
methodology could be expanded to more sources as needed. Attribute values are set for both
sources as shown in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Data Consistency Scheme
Value Meaning
00 Both alternate sources are NOT consistent
01 First alternate source NOT consistent, Second alternate source IS consistent
10 First alternate source IS consistent, Second alternate source NOT consistent
11 Both alternate sources ARE consistent
When calculating the data consistency for a particular transaction, there are four types of
transactions that may occur: retrieval, addition, updating, or deletion. The basic computation for
each case is the same; we distinguish between them because the actual steps taken to compute
trust are different for each with the exception of addition and update methods. They are grouped
together, leaving us with three ways to calculate the data consistency value. The following
discussion assumes method invocation for an aircraft with id a3, although the methodology is the
same for any data type.
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1. Retrieval methods: The first alternate source is queried for existing aircraft with an id of a3.
Any results are checked field by field to see if the record completely matches. In the case
of aircraft a3, the model and status fields from each alternate source are compared to those
in the primary source. If both fields match, then the attribute bit representing the matching
source is set to 1. If either of the fields do not match, then the bit is set to 0. If no results are
returned, then the record obviously does not match, and the bit is set to 0.
2. Addition/update methods: This process differs from the retrieval methods in that alternate
sources are queried for data by all fields of an object. If the model field of aircraft a3 is set
to F-16, and the status field is set to ready, then each alternate source would be queried
for aircraft with an ID of a3, a model of F-16, and a status of ready. The returned results
are processed the same manner as the retrieval methods. Complete record matches yield an
attribute value of 1, and incomplete matches or empty result sets yield a value of 0.
It should be noted that the first time an object is added to the information space, it will
not exist in alternate sources, resulting in a Data Consistency value of 0 for each alternate
source. Despite this low consistency rating, the newly added data could be accurate. This
indicator is not a measure of accuracy, rather its only purpose is to measure whether the
data is consistent across multiple sources, regardless of accuracy. Answering the question of
accuracy requires a source that has been certified as being accurate. Such a consideration is
beyond the scope of this work, but is mentioned to clarify our intentions for this indicator.
3. Deletion methods: In this type of method the first alternate source is queried for existing
aircraft with an id of a3 as is done for the retrieval methods. If there are results returned
then the alternate source is not consistent since the aircraft a3 is in the process of being
deleted from the primary source. Accordingly the attribute bit is set to 0. An empty result
set indicates that the source is consistent and receives an attribute value of 1. Similar to
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the addition/update methods, this does not measure whether deleted data is accurate, only
whether it is consistent among other sources.
The last two attribute bits of the Data Consistency indicator are reserved for user bracketing
preferences as outlined in Table 3.1. The complete algorithm for determining attribute values as
described above is attached to this document in Algorithm A.2.
3.4.4 Source Credibility. In this model, sources are assigned a credibility rating on a
scale from one to four, represented in two digit binary, as shown in Table 3.3. These values are
assigned initially based upon the likelihood of accurate data coming from a particular source.
As the service is accessed by users, each source builds a historical transaction log allowing the
credibility ratings to be adjusted. Higher Data Consistency ratings over time will serve to raise
the source credibility, whereas a trend of lower consistency will lower the source credibility. Like
the previously mentioned indicators, the last two bits of this indicator are a bracket assignment,
as outlined in Table 3.1.
Table 3.3: Source Credibility Values
Rating Meaning
00 Low credibility
01 Medium-low credibility
10 Medium-high credibility
11 High credibility
3.4.5 Data Currency. In order to determine a value for Data Currency all data types
are assigned an expected currency, based on how often they should be updated (explained below).
When a message arrives for processing, the current time is captured and compared to the last time
that an update occurred for the data object being accessed. The scheme used for representing
currency values is shown in Table 3.4. The first two bits of the indicator value represent the actual
currency, and the last two represent the expected currency.
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Table 3.4: Currency bit representation
Bit Rep Meaning
00 Data is on the magnitude of minutes old
01 Data is on the magnitude of hours old
10 Data is on the magnitude of days old
11 Data is on the magnitude of weeks old
Data that remains fairly static will receive a longer expected currency than a data type that
is very dynamic. As an example, Air Force Major Commands (MAJCOM) usually have the same
commander for two years; the number of bases associated with a particular MAJCOM does not
change very often. Thus, a MAJCOM data type would have the longest expected currency value
assigned. At the opposite end of the spectrum is information about on-hand munitions inventories.
It is assumed that information is updated as munitions are used, so it follows that it would be
assigned a short expected currency value.
If a method is invoked for a MAJCOM object at timestamp 2005-01-22-1200, transaction logs
will be checked to see when that particular MAJCOM object was last updated. If the timestamp of
the last update is 2005-01-20-1200, then the currency of this message is on the magnitude of days
old (exactly two day to be precise), thus the current currency value would be 10. Combined with
the expected value of the MAJCOM type, the resulting trust value would be 1011, or B. Since the
actual currency is better than the expected currency, this will raise the trust value of this indicator.
3.5 Interpretation of Encoded Trust
Even with a repeatable method of building trust values, an interpretation of a particular value
must be given when information is requested in the Data Retrieval mode shown in Figure 3.1. Six
digit hexadecimal numbers convey little in terms of practical interpretation. Machines making
decisions based on these generated values can parse each whole value and easily determine why
it received the value that it did and act accordingly. Thus, this avenue of interpretation is meant
primarily for the human use and interpretation of the trust values, although the use of allowable
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tolerance is certainly an important consideration for machine based decisions as well. Before the
details of interpretation can be given, we must first discuss the notion of allowable tolerance in a
decision.
3.5.1 Allowable Tolerance. All decisions carry a certain level of impact with their outcome.
At a simplified level, consider the decision of which runway an aircraft should use when taking
off. Aside from local ground traffic management policies which may dictate the use of one runway
over another, this decision has no impact on the end result of the flight. Once the aircraft is airborne
the appropriate course will be set to wherever the destination is, regardless of which runway was
used for takeoff. Conversely, the decision of whether or not to refuel the aircraft has a significant
impact on the ability to reach the final destination; lack of fuel significantly reduces the range of
the aircraft. Similar impacts exist within decisions made on the battlefield, and a decision support
system such as the one proposed should have allowances for adjusting the importance of the
decision being made.
Expressing this adjustment as "dial-a-trust", each indicator is given an adjustable tolerance
dial that can be raised and lowered. A raised tolerance dial indicates a high tolerance, or a wide
range of tolerance in the decision at hand. The general effect of raising the tolerance dial will result
in a higher trust interpretation, giving the user more confidence in the data at hand. Naturally
it follows that a lowered tolerance dial narrows the range of tolerance, effectively lowering the
trust interpretation. This should bring a certain apprehension to the decision maker as certain
thresholds are crossed.
In the case where a particular trust value is strongly in the "green" zone of the display, adjust-
ments to the allowable tolerance would not likely be seen. However, considering the case where an
initial interpretation results in a value towards the bottom of the "green" zone, a lowered tolerance
could easily bump the interpretation down into the "yellow" zone. This case serves to alert the de-
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cision maker to the weakness of the initial interpretation. Similarly, if an interpretation is towards
the top of the "yellow" zone, a raised tolerance could easily translate to a green representation.
In our simplified example, when deciding which runway to use the tolerance dial could
be raised. This would in effect raise the trust interpretation of the data at hand, allowing a free
decision to be made from any available runway. When deciding whether or not to refuel, the
tolerance dial would be lowered, putting focus on the importance of refueling. Decision makers
would hopefully decide to refuel the aircraft to allow the destination to be safely reached.
The present work proposes five levels of tolerance: low, medium-low, normal, medium-high,
and high. The contribution of each level to the interpretation value us discussed in the following
section. In the general case, a low tolerance lowers the interpretation, while a high tolerance raises
the interpretation.
3.5.2 Interpretation Methodology. As mentioned earlier, interpretation of trust values is
primarily intended for human users. In this light it can be thought of as a translation of the
hexadecimal numbers to a decimal percentage. Each of the three WS-Security indicators are
interpreted in the same exact manner, while the other indicators are all interpreted uniquely.
Each indicator receives a value between 1 and 100 representing a percentage of how trustable the
information is thought to be.
3.5.2.1 WS-Security, Source Credibility, and Data Consistency Indicators. WS-Security,
Source Credibility, and Data Consistency indicators are grouped together for this discussion be-
cause the trust representation for each incorporates bracketing preferences. The first two bits of
the trust value are the actual attributes used to gauge trust, and the second two bits designate
the bracketing placed on that indicator. Each two-bit attribute group is given a high and low
percentage bound, within which the interpretation value must fall. The percentage bounds for
each indicator are shown in Table 3.5. The range between these bounds is divided into 20 values
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grouped into four brackets. Within each bracket are five values, each value representing the trust
interpretation according to the amount of allowable tolerance.
Table 3.5: High and Low Percentage Bounds
Indicator Attribute High Low
WS-Security 00 30 1
WS-Security 01 31 100
Source Credibility 00 30 1
Source Credibility 01 50 31
Source Credibility 10 70 51
Source Credibility 11 71 100
Data Consistency 00 40 1
Data Consistency 01 60 41
Data Consistency 10 60 41
Data Consistency 11 61 100
It should be noticed that the unflawed attributes (01 for WS-Security; 11 for Source Credibility
and Data Consistency) have reversed high and low percentage bounds. This is designed on
purpose so that the desired bracketing results in an accurate interpretation value. When attributes
are equal to anything other than 11, something took place to lower the trust of that indicator and
we will consider the indicators’ input to be flawed. Setting aside the indicator bracket, if a Data
Consistency indicator has an attribute value of 10, then according to Table 3.2 the second alternate
source did not have consistent data. In this case, the "perfect" scenario occurs when both sources
are consistent, but since only one of them was deemed consistent, the situational input is flawed.
Each interpretation value is calculated using a multiplier value. Table 3.6 lists the multiplier
values for each bracket and tolerance pair for flawed attribute groups (00 for WS-Security; 00, 01,
and 10 for Source Credibility and Data Consistency). When the attribute value is not flawed (01
for WS-Security; 11 for Source Credibility and Data Consistency), the multiplier is determined
differently since the percentage bounds are reversed. For example in the case of a WS-Security
indicator with attribute value 01 the "high" value is 31 and the "low" value is 100 (from Table 3.5).
The multiplier values for this case are shown in Table 3.7. The multiplier values ensure that the
interpretation values increase within each bracket, yet the overall interpretation values decrease
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for flawed attributes and increase for flawless attributes. In this way a flawless attribute has greater
potential to increase the interpretation, while a flawed attribute has greater potential to decrease the
interpretation.
Table 3.6: Multiplier Values for Flawed Attribute Groups
Bracket Tolerance Multiplier
00 Low 15
00 Medium-low 16
00 Normal 17
00 Medium-high 18
00 High 19
01 Low 10
01 Medium-low 11
01 Normal 12
01 Medium-high 13
01 High 14
10 Low 5
10 Medium-low 6
10 Normal 7
10 Medium-high 8
10 High 9
11 Low 0
11 Medium-low 1
11 Normal 2
11 Medium-high 3
11 High 4
With the high and low percentage bounds from Table 3.5 designated as percentHi and
percentLo respectively, and a multiplier from Tables 3.6 and 3.7, the formula used in the general
case for calculating the interpretation is shown below in Equation 3.1. Figures 3.3 - 3.5 illustrate
the possible interpretations for each indicator type using this formula.
(percentHi - percentLo
19
×multiplier
)
+ percentLo (3.1)
Interpretation for each of the indicators types discussed here is calculated using the same
formula. The difference lies in the percentage bounds specified in Table 3.5, and the number of
attribute groups. WS-Security only uses one bit to indicate its attributes, which when prepended
with a leading zero only leaves two attribute groups. Source Credibility uses both attribute bits
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Figure 3.3: WS-Security Indicator Interpretation Chart
Source Credibility Interpretation
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Figure 3.4: Source Credibility Indicator Interpretation Chart
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Table 3.7: Multiplier Values for Flawless Attribute Groups
Bracket Tolerance Multiplier
00 Low 19
00 Medium-low 18
00 Normal 17
00 Medium-high 16
00 High 15
01 Low 14
01 Medium-low 13
01 Normal 12
01 Medium-high 11
01 High 10
10 Low 9
10 Medium-low 8
10 Normal 7
10 Medium-high 6
10 High 5
11 Low 4
11 Medium-low 3
11 Normal 2
11 Medium-high 1
11 High 0
to represent its trust value, and so has four attribute groups. Data Consistency also uses both
attribute bits, but its nature requires a unique approach. Since the attributes 01 and 10 represent
one of two alternate sources being consistent, there is no distinction in the contribution to trust
value that either source brings. Thus, they receive the same set of interpretation values using the
same percentage bounds.
As an example, consider a WS-Security indicator with the value 0010, and a normal tolerance.
From Table 3.5 we set percentHi equal to 30, and percentLo equal to 1. Looking up the appropriate
multiplier from Table 3.6, we set the multiplier equal to 7. The resulting trust interpretation for
that indicator is 11.684%, as shown in Equation 3.2.
(30.000 − 1.000
19
× 7
)
+ 1 = 11.684 (3.2)
Alternatively, if we have a Data Consistency indicator with value 1101, and a high tolerance,
we must use a multiplier for the case when all attributes are not flawed. We set percentHi equal to
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Data Consistency Interpretation
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Figure 3.5: Data Consistency Indicator Interpretation Chart
61, percentLo equal to 100, and set our multiplier equal to 10 from Table 3.7. Our trust interpretation
is calculated as 79.474% as shown in Equation 3.3.
(61.000 − 100.000
19
× 10
)
+ 100.000 = 79.474 (3.3)
3.5.2.2 Data Currency Indicator. Calculating the interpretation for Data Currency is
much simpler, as there is no tolerance to account for. The general case is that if the actual currency
is equal to or newer than the expected currency, then the interpretation will be 100%. Accordingly,
an actual currency of 00 automatically receives a 100%. The older the actual currency is when
compared to the expected currency the lower the interpretation becomes as shown in Table 3.8.
The algorithm for determining this is shown in Algorithm A.1.
3.5.2.3 Interpretation of All Indicators. As one of our stated goals is to provide
insight into the overall trustability of the message, we must move beyond interpreting individual
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Table 3.8: Data Currency Indicator Interpretation Table
Actual 00 01 10 11
00 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
01 66.667 100.000 100.000 100.000
10 33.333 66.667 100.000 100.000
11 0.000 33.333 66.667 100.000
Expected
indicators. Interpretation of each indicator results in a percentage, allowing us to easily average
the six indicator interpretations to obtain an overall interpretation. Due to the reconstructible
trust values the average value does not weaken the trust assessment. It is merely an attempt to
provide an intuitive understanding at a glance of the trust assessment. The full trust value, as well
as individual indicator interpretations are available and shown to the user alongside the overall
average.
3.5.3 Web Services Context. As mentioned earlier, the focus of this work is in a secure
web services environment, although the concepts discussed thus far could easily take place in any
distributed computing environment. Using SOAP-based web services allows us to easily compute
the trust for each transaction in the system. As is demonstrated in Chapter IV, there are checkpoints
that all incoming and outgoing SOAP messages must pass through. This centralization provides
assurance that all transactions are able to be accounted for when determining trust. In other
words, there are not any back doors into the system with which one could bypass implemented
trust mechanisms. This assumes that direct access to the database is secured appropriately and
unauthorized database access is not a factor.
3.6 Summary
This chapter presents a methodology for assessing information trustability in a secure web
services environment. Each of the six trustability indicators with their respective attributes are
defined. Algorithms are defined with which to calculate a repeatable trust assessment value for
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each indicator. Finally, a means of interpreting the derived trust values is given. The presented
algorithms and methodologies are implemented in Chapter IV.
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IV. Implementation
An example web service has been built to illustrate the use of the trust determination algorithms
presented in this work. The service is called AssetTracker, and although the concepts and tech-
niques presented are broadly applicable, we have chosen the application domain of tracking
battlefield assets. Sun Microsystems JavaTM [4] programming language was chosen for this task,
since its cross-platform capabilities make any future enhancements to this work easily accommo-
dated. Additionally, extensive support for web service technologies exist on the Java platform, to
include SOAP, WSDL, and XML.
4.1 AssetTracker Overview
The AssetTracker system was designed with several goals in mind. First and foremost, it had
to be a web service with methods accessible via SOAP calls. Second, it needed to be a secure web
service application, specifically using the WS-Security specification requiring user authorization,
as well as message level signature and encryption. These first two requirements were driven by
the main goal of this work to assess information trustability in a secure web services environment.
Thirdly, it needed to simulate information flows and data that may be tracked in a battlefield
situation in order to provide some real world applicability. Finally, it needed to easily allow for
trust values to be calculated as messages came into the system because of our overarching goal of
assessing information trustability.
AssetTracker contains information about combat assets and their locations. At the highest
level are location objects consisting of MAJCOM’s, which are in turn composed of bases. Each
base has a group of assets that are assigned to it. For the purposes of this experiment, assets
are limited to aircraft, munitions, and personnel. Individual assets are not associated with each
other in any way other than belonging to the same base. The objects and their associations are
depicted in Figure 4.1. It is recognized that the real world value of this system falls far below
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actual requirements for tracking battlefield assets, however our focus is not the actual application,
but rather insight that can be gained into the trustability of its information.
Asset
id:String
status:String
base:String
Personnel
title:String
Aircraft
model:String
Munitions
name:String
Majcom Base
majcom:String
Location
id:String
name:String
1 * 1
*
Figure 4.1: UML Diagram for AssetTracker Objects
All AssetTracker objects are stored persistently in a relational database, with appropriate
relationships such that it mimics an object oriented programming methodology. This approach
was chosen over creating an object hierarchy for reasons of implementation simplicity. Again the
goal of this work is to examine information trustability. A partial database schema is shown in
Figure 4.2, and a full SQL DDL description is listed in Appendix B. It should be noted that there
are additional database tables shown in Figure 4.5 that deal with assessing information trustability.
The tables shown here in Figure 4.2 deal exclusively with the AssetTracker objects.
Location and asset objects each have four types of methods: addition, retrieval, update, and
deletion. Addition methods can also be thought of as creation methods; it is with these methods
that new objects are put into the database. An addition method takes all attributes of the object to
add as input parameters. The retrieval methods, using Javabean terminology, are "getter" methods
and require only the id of the desired object as an input parameter. A comma delimited string of
object attributes is returned by the method. Update methods are analogous to "setter" methods,
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base
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(25)
base_id (PRIMARY KEY)
majcom_id (FOREIGN KEY)
base_name
majcom
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(40)
majcom_id (PRIMARY KEY)
majcom_name
munition
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(20)
VARCHAR(20)
munition_id (PRIMARY KEY)
base_id (FOREIGN KEY)
name
status
aircraft
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(20)
VARCHAR(20)
aircraft_id (PRIMARY KEY)
base_id (FOREIGN KEY)
model
status
personnel
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(20)
VARCHAR(20)
personnel_id (PRIMARY KEY)
base_id (FOREIGN KEY)
title
status
Figure 4.2: AssetTracker Objects: Database Schema
and take as input parameters the id of the object to update, along with the complete list of object
attributes with their new values.
Deletion methods accept the object id as an input parameter, but they require some checking
before deleting the specified object. Asset objects may be freely deleted since they have no child
objects. Location objects however must not have any instantiated child objects in order for them to
be deleted. For example, a MAJCOM cannot be deleted unless there are no bases associated with
it. As well, a base cannot be deleted unless there are no assets associated with it. These restrictions
address standard relational database referential integrity concerns.
The entire AssetTracker system (to include the web service environment) is encapsulated in
a set of Java packages organized by functionality. Table 4.1 outlines the various packages and their
purpose.
4.2 Web Service Environment
The AssetTracker system is written as a Java class and converted to a SOAP-based web
service courtesy of utilities provided with Systinet WASP Server for Java [7]. The AssetTracker
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Table 4.1: AssetTracker Java Packages
Package Name Purpose
edu.afit.assetTracker Web Service code for all three instances
edu.afit.assetTracker.client.forward Client code for the ForwardWS instance
edu.afit.assetTracker.client.forward.iface Interface code for the ForwardWS instance client;
generated by WASP utilities
edu.afit.assetTracker.client.home Client code for the HomeWS instance
edu.afit.assetTracker.client.home.iface Interface code for the HomeWS instance client;
generated by WASP utilities
edu.afit.assetTracker.client.rear Client code for the RearWS instance
edu.afit.assetTracker.client.rear.iface Interface code for the RearWS instance client;
generated by WASP utilities
edu.afit.assetTracker.persistence Manages all database connectivity
edu.afit.assetTracker.ui Main user interface used to generate all sample
output
edu.afit.assetTracker.util Interceptor, Handler, and IncomingValidator code
edu.afit.assetTracker.trust Trust interpretation
class is extended to three separate classes which in turn are converted to individual web services.
Each one is identical in operation, differing only in the content and battlefield-related location that
they represent. This lends itself to a more realistic simulation of battlefield asset tracking, and
allows for data consistency checks. The three web services are deployed as ForwardWS, RearWS,
and HomeWS.
The ForwardWS represents assets of a forward deployed unit, closest to the action on the
battlefield. RearWS represents a rear supporting unit, slightly distanced from the action, yet still
in the battle theater. HomeWS represents support from the CONUS, very much removed from the
action and theater. Each web service instance has a respective client that represents users of each
service. Figure 4.3 shows how each instance interacts with its client.
Each service instance has inherent attributes due to the location it represents. The ForwardWS
is considered the most current source, being at the center of the battlefield means that it generates
information first. The accuracy is assumed to be slightly lower; due to the fast paced nature of its
location there is no time to double check information as it is entered into the system. Since RearWS
is located farther from the battlefield center, it takes longer to receive information updates, lowering
its currency. However, that extra time allows for information to be verified thus improving its
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Figure 4.3: Service Instance and Client Layout
accuracy. HomeWS is the furthest location, so its currency is the lowest of the three instances. Its
distance from the battlefield is so great that its accuracy is considered lower than that of ForwardWS;
errors caught and fixed at RearWS could be re-introduced by the time the information flows back
to CONUS.
Functionality of the service clients is straightforward. They each establish a connection to
their respective web service, authenticating as the user known to that service. Once connected
they are able to invoke available methods, however they provide no user interface as imple-
mented. For illustrative purposes, a user interface to the ForwardWS client is provided in the
edu.afit.assetTracker.ui.AssetTrackerUI class; no interfaces for the other clients are pro-
vided. A variety of methods are invoked in the provided client classes in order to demonstrate a
wide range of trust values and outcomes. Actual output from client execution is shown in Section
4.6.
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WASP provides several mechanisms for securing message traffic; we are using its WS-
Security implementation. All of the methods for each data type are specified to use full WS-Security,
i.e. user authorization, signature, and encryption are required for all message transactions. Any
message that does not meet these requirements is automatically rejected by the WASP server. The
security requirements are specified in a deployment descriptor file, where methods are listed with
their required security parameters. Methods that are not listed in this file do not have any required
security; the effect of unsecured messages on trust calculations is discussed in Section 4.3.
When the specified security requirements are met, the message travels through a series of
checkpoints before reaching the actual method being invoked. Similar checks are applied on
the way back to the client. A graphical representation of this flow is shown in Figure 4.4. The
checkpoints are extendible classes provided by the Systinet WASP server and are used to calculate
the trust assessment values; we discuss them briefly here and in more detail in Section 4.3.
Client invokes web 
service method
ServerInterceptor intercepts 
clients message
IncomingValidator validates 
security of message
Web Service 
processes method, 
accepts any input and 
generates any output
Results of method 
invocation returned
ServerHandler processes 
incoming SOAP message
ServerHandler processes 
outgoing SOAP message
NoValid 
Security?
Yes
No results returned; 
transaction ended
Web Service Client
Web Service Server
Input 
parameters 
captured
Transaction record 
initiated; body-Id 
captured; Data 
Currency, Source 
Credibility calculated 
and recorded Input parameters 
recorded; Output 
captured and 
recorded; Data 
Consistency,  
calculated and 
recorded.
WSS-* Indicators 
captured and 
recorded
Figure 4.4: SOAP Message Flow
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The first checkpoint the message passes through is called a ServerInterceptor. The ServerIn-
terceptor class has access to the raw data in the message; it sees the plain-text XML document. If
message-level encryption has successfully been applied, then no data will be able to accessed at
this stage. Despite this, certain attributes of an encrypted message are left in clear-text and are able
to be gathered at this point. However, an unencrypted message is able to be read in its entirety,
attributes and data.
The message next moves from the ServerInterceptor to the IncomingValidator class, which
validates the security of the message. Checks are performed to ensure that the user is authorized,
and that both signature and encryption were correctly applied to the message. If there is any check
out of order or missing from the WS-Security header of the message it will be rejected and the
transaction will end.
Once the message is successfully validated it moves to the ServerHandler class, which has
access to the SOAP message and can access individual parts of the message directly. This is different
from the raw XML access that is seen in the ServerInterceptor. Within the WASP environment the
SOAP message is represented as a Document Object Model (DOM) object with methods that can
access and manipulate the data within. Even if a message has been sent with encryption, it has
been decrypted by the WASP server at this point, so we are able to gather data from the fields of
the SOAP message (e.g. input parameters on request and output message on return).
After passing through the ServerHandler process, the message arrives at the actual web
service where the method invocation is processed. For the return trip back to the client, the
message passes back through the ServerHandler process and straight back to the client. It should
be pointed out that these checkpoints are all contained within and belong to each service instance,
they are not part of the general server environment.
Each web service instance has connections to three databases. The first is considered the
primary source, this is the database that the service uses for storing its asset information. Access to
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this database is read/write, enabling the service instance to access and update its own databases.
The second two connections are considered alternate sources, corresponding to the other two
service instances. Access to these databases is read only, controlled by user rights in the database
server. From the perspective of a given user these alternate sources are used exclusively for
calculating Data Consistency. Considering the ForwardWS instance, its primary connection is to
its own database, and its alternate sources connect to the RearWS and HomeWS databases. These
connections are illustrated in the previously listed Figure 4.3.
4.3 Trust Calculation
The aforementioned checkpoints are where trust is calculated as each message is processed.
Each checkpoint calculates a subset of trustability indicators and stores them in a transaction log.
The ServerInterceptor initiates a transaction entry in the log, and computes the Data Currency
as well as Source Credibility factors. The IncomingValidator verifies and computes trust for the
WS-Security indicators. The ServerHandler (incoming) captures the input parameters for the
method being invoked; these are used for determining Data Consistency. On the outgoing side,
the ServerHandler captures output generated by the method request and calculates trust for the
Data Consistency Indicator. A summary of the checkpoints and their purpose is shown below in
Table 4.2, as well as in the previous shown Figure 4.4.
Table 4.2: Role of Checkpoints in Trust Calculation
Checkpoint Purpose
ServerInterceptor Initiates transaction; calculates Data Currency,
Source Credibility
IncomingValidator Calculates WS-Security indicators
ServerHandler Calculates Data Consistency
As mentioned in Section 4.1, additional tables are required in the database. Their function is
to assist in the computation of information trustability. The first is a transaction log which records
details about each method invocation (name of method, input parameters, and output returned),
as well as the calculated trust for every transaction. The second stores the expected currency
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values for each data type. The final table stores client preferences for indicator bracketing, as well
as the source credibility rating. For illustrative purposes three scenarios are provided in the client
interface so that a range of trust values can be assessed, but the values can be easily updated to
reflect a clients true bracketing preferences. These additional tables are shown in Figure 4.5, with
the full SQL DDL description listed in Appendix B.
txLog
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(15)
VARCHAR(45)
VARCHAR(20)
VARCHAR(255)
TEXT
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
tx_id (PRIMARY KEY)
timestamp
srvBodyID
methodName
inputStr
outputStr
t_wssSig
t_wssEnc
t_wssAuth
t_dataCons
t_srcCred
t_dataCurr
expectedCurrency
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(20)
VARCHAR(2)
cr_id (PRIMARY KEY)
dataType
expCurr
clientProfile
VARCHAR(10)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
VARCHAR(2)
client_id (PRIMARY KEY)
w_wssSig
w_wssEnc
w_wssAuth
w_dataCons
w_srcCred
w_dataCurr
actSrcCred
Figure 4.5: Additional Database Tables
4.3.1 Detailed Role of ServerInterceptor. As briefly mentioned earlier, the ServerInterceptor
is what initiates the transaction entry. Each message has a unique identification number. This
number is extracted from the raw XML data using the second group from the following regular
expression: (<e:Body.*wsu:Id="Body-Id-)([-a-fA-F0-9]*)(">). An input string of <e:Body
wsu:Id="Body-Id-0212d130-722e-11d9-b8d7-f300a1e0b8d7"> to this expression would yield
an extracted ID of 0212d130-722e-11d9-b8d7-f300a1e0b8d7. This ID is stored in the transaction
log so that the IncomingValidator and ServerHandler can update the log for the same message.
A timestamp at message receipt is also taken, and compared to the timestamp of the last update.
The difference between the two is combined with expected currency for the object type and stored
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as the Data Currency value. Source Credibility is also calculated here by examining the specified
credibility for the source and retrieving the clients preferred bracketing from the clientProfile table.
Initial values are assigned for the remaining indicators (WS-Security Authorization, WS-
Security Signature, WS-Security Encryption, and Data Consistency). The values are the lowest
possible for that indicator, (00 + bracket). In the event that the transaction ends prematurely or
something other than the desired outcome results, the trust values will remain at that low value.
In the event that a method is not listed in the deployment descriptor file, it will be unsecure and
there will be no body-id in the message. If this happens the body-id field in the transaction log
is set to "unsecure", and all of the initial low trust values will remain. Regardless of whether a
secure or unsecure message generated low trust values, this should serve as an indicator to users
of the system that trustability is legitimately degraded. For example, either the data has been
incorrectly input, unsecured methods have been invoked, or a malicious user has bypassed the
security mechanisms in place.
4.3.2 Detailed Role of IncomingValidator. The body-id number that was recorded by the
ServerInterceptor is extracted from the message by the IncomingValidator so it can update the
correct record in the transaction log. The message security configuration is parsed into individual
components and checked to ensure that each one (authorization, signature, and encryption) was
correctly applied. Each component is examined independently; if any component was correctly
implemented, then the trust value is increased, otherwise it is decreased. As mentioned previously,
a message that has not been properly secured will be rejected by the WASP server, meaning that
it wouldn’t make it to this point. In that case, the initial values set by the ServerInterceptor of the
lowest trust possible would stand in the transaction log, interpreted later as a caution flag to users.
Even though the service has been configured to require maximum security, we still require
and enforce these security checks. If high security is required and expected, then a sudden lapse in
security can mean one of two things: a security hole has been unintentionally left in the system (e.g.
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methods not specified in the deployment descriptor), or a security breach has been intentionally
created by a malicious user. In either case, the trustability of the information within the system
should be lowered. Again the values set initially by the ServerInterceptor provide that safety net.
4.3.3 Detailed Role of ServerHandler. The ServerHandler is composed of (among other
things) a method that handles SOAP requests (handleRequest()), and a method that handles the
response (handleResponse()). The state of the method invocation request is maintained between
these two methods, such that the session is not complete until the response has been sent. This
affords the opportunity for the body-id of the message to be extracted from the request, and held
until the response, allowing the transaction log to be updated for the correct record. The single
state also decreases the number of database transactions that must be made; data is gathered from
the request method and held until all necessary data has been gathered from the response method.
At that point the transaction log is updated once for that message recording the calculated Data
Consistency value.
The main contribution of the ServerHandler is the calculation of the Data Consistency indi-
cator. It is done at this point because the input to and output from the method can be seen here.
Using the aforementioned alternate database connections, a query is built based on the type of
object being accessed, the input supplied, and any output that was returned. Both of the alternate
sources are queried for similar data, returning a SQL result set that is parsed to determine if there
were any matches. As described in Section 3.4.3 and using Algorithm A.2, if a match is found,
then the consistency bit for that source is set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0.
4.4 Trust Interpretation
As noted in Table 4.1, the edu.afit.assetTracker.trust package handles all of the trust
interpretation. It contains an overall class (edu.afit.assetTracker.trust.Trust), and five ex-
tension classes for each type of indicator. There is no interface code in this package, it is purely an
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interpretation engine that accepts trust values and outputs interpretations. The user interface is
part of edu.afit.AssetTracker.ui as demonstrated in Section 4.6.
The main trust class accepts a hexadecimal trust value string as a constructor parameter.
Upon instantiation of a trust object, the provided trust value is parsed into individual indicator
values. Then a TreeMap is built holding appropriate trust objects (WS-Security, Source Credibility,
Data Consistency, or Data Currency) with the indicator name as the key. The trust value must have
indicators in the following order: WS-Security Authorization, WS-Security Signature, WS-Security
Encryption, Data Consistency, Source Credibility, and Data Currency. This ordering is ensured
by programatically building the trust value from the records in the transaction log table and by
denying users the opportunity to manually enter trust values.
As each trust object is created, its interpretation value is automatically calculated and stored
in the object. A getter method is available for retrieving and displaying the value as needed.
The initial value is calculated with a normal tolerance value (010), but users can easily adjust the
amount of desired tolerance in the provided interface. If tolerances are changed, then users can
request a new calculation of the trust interpretation, and the new value is calculated as before.
Because the Data Currency indicator does not have tolerance to account for due to the way it is
represented, the Data Currency trust interpretation class does not have a mechanism for adjusting
it, although an empty method is in place for future capabilities of re-calculating the interpretation.
4.5 Build Environment
The web services runtime environment used is Systinet WASP Server for Java. Since all
developed code is compliant with Java 1.4.2_05, it ought to be able to be run on any platform for
which there is a Java Virtual Machine and MySQL database available. Despite the promises of
cross platform compatibility, it would come as no surprise if some unanticipated errors occur if
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this code is executed on a different platform configuration. To establish a common baseline, the
tools and versions listed in Table 4.3 should be used to guarantee the advertised performance.
Table 4.3: Development Environment Baseline
Product Version Purpose
JavaTM 1.4.2_05 Main development language
Systinet WASP Server for Java 5.0 Web services runtime environment
MySQL [5] 4.1.7 Relational database engine
Eclipse [3] 3.0.1 Java IDE used for all development except
GUI building
Apache Ant [1] 1.6.1 Java build tool
NetBeans [6] 3.6 Java IDE used for GUI building
Mac OS X [2] 10.3.7 Operating system
In addition to the package hierarchy outlined in Table 4.1, there are several files used for
compiling, deploying, and running the code. All files are listed from the project root. Since Ant is
used as the build tool, \build.xml and \build.properties are used to invoke any actions. The
\dd folder contains the previously mentioned deployment descriptors that tell the WASP server
how to configure the service instance and set security parameters. The \wsdl folder is where
WSDL files are stored when they are generated. If the entire project is opened and used within
Eclipse, the build file can be executed using its integrated Ant tools. If the project is run from a
command line interface, then the \runant.sh or \runant.bat (depending on the users operating
sytem) files must be executed in place of the regular Ant command to setup necessary CLASSPATH
and environment variables.
The Ant build file provided contains all necessary targets to compile, deploy, and run the
service instances and clients "out of the box". All targets assume that the WASP server is already
running at the address and port specified in the \build.properties file. The pertinent targets are
listed and defined below in Table 4.4 where atDBNAME is equal to atForward, atRear, or atHome.
A series of SQL files are provided to create all necessary databases, tables, and initial data.
The entire database environment can be reset to a clean initial condition by executing master.sql
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Table 4.4: Key Ant Targets
Target Purpose
create_identities Creates the necessary identities and certificates for both the server and
client. Must be run once before any of the example code will work prop-
erly.
make_*_service Three targets exist, * indicates forward, rear, or home. Compiles the ser-
vice, generates necessary WSDL files, and builds a JAR file for deployment
to the server
deploy_*_service Three targets exist, * indicates forward, rear, or home. Deploys the service
to the specified service instance
undeploy_*_service Three targets exist, * indicates forward, rear, or home. Undeploys the spec-
ified service instance
make_*_client Three targets, * indicates forward, rear, or home. Compiles the client, re-
trieves the WSDL files from the deployed services, and builds a JAR file for
execution
run_gui Launches the interface for testing the code for this work
from a MySQL command prompt. The files and their respective functionality are listed below in
Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Database Initialization SQL Files
File Purpose Called By
master.sql Calls all files, resets the database to a
fresh initial state
N/A
createTables.sql Creates the required tables for each
database
atDBNAME/setupDBNAME.sql
databaseCreate.sql Creates each database (atForward,
atRear, and atHome)
master.sql
dataClientProfile.sql Loads data for the client bracketing
preferences
atDBNAME/setupDBNAME.sql
dataCurrency.sql Loads default expected currency val-
ues for each data type
atDBNAME/setupDBNAME.sql
atDBNAME/setupForward.sql Creates tables, loads expected cur-
rency, bracketing preferences, and
sample data for each data type
master.sql
atDBNAME/dataAircraft.sql Loads sample data for Aircraft objects atDBNAME/setupDBNAME.sql
atDBNAME/dataLocation.sql Loads sample data for MAJCOM and
Bases objects
atDBNAME/setupDBNAME.sql
atDBNAME/dataMunition.sql Loads sample data for Munition ob-
jects
atDBNAME/setupDBNAME.sql
atDBNAME/dataPersonnel.sql Loads sample data for Personnel ob-
jects
atDBNAME/setupDBNAME.sql
4.6 Sample Output
As listed in Table 4.4, the create_identities must have been run before any code can be
successfully executed. Assuming that it is has been run, and that the services are deployed to their
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respective locations, we can begin executing the client code. The main AssetTracker interface is
launched by executing the run_gui target and is shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Initial Application Screen
In order to generate a range of trust values, three scenarios are available within the Asset-
Tracker interface. Each scenario sets client bracket preferences and source credibility rating for the
ForwardWS as shown in Table 4.6. As a reminder, bracket preferences range from narrow to wide,
represented in binary from 00 to 11 and are listed in Table 3.1; source credibility ratings range from
low to high, represented in binary from 00 to 11 and are listed in Table 3.3. Once a scenario has been
selected, the user can execute a set of sample transactions. This invokes a sequence of methods
for each object type in the following order: MAJCOM, Base, Aircraft, Munition, Personnel. Each
object has a variety of get, delete, add, and update methods invoked in no particular order.
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Table 4.6: Scenario Configurations
Scenario w_wssAuth w_wssSig w_wssEnc w_dataCons w_srcCred w_dataCurr actSrcCred
1 11 11 11 01 10 00 01
2 11 11 11 00 10 11 11
3 10 10 10 11 01 10 00
Each scenario has an inherent influence on the trust values that are generated. Scenario
Two(high) generates the highest values, given its total bracket preferences are higher than Scenarios
One(medium) or Three(low), and its source credibility is the highest. Similarly Scenario Three(low)
generates the lowest values since it has the narrowest bracket preferences. Scenario One(medium)
is the default scenario, and generates trust values in between Scenarios Two(high) and Three(low).
Once the sample data transactions have been executed, the resulting transaction log can be
viewed for analysis. This presents a table showing transaction ID, method name, input string,
output string, and trust value from the transaction log as well as a calculated trust interpretation.
This screen is shown in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Trust Value Table
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The interpretation values are calculated using a normal tolerance and color coded as de-
scribed in Section 3.2. There is no room for tolerance adjustment on this screen, this is merely
a high level view of the overall trustability assessment for each transaction. In order to adjust
tolerance for a particular transaction, users can drill down for more information on the selected
table row. Considering transaction tx6 as shown in Figure 4.7, the resulting detailed view of the
trust interpretation is shown in Figure 4.8.
Figure 4.8: Detailed Trust Interpretation Display
In the detailed view, interpretation of individual indicators are color coded, as well as the
interpretation for the entire transaction. These values and their color coding change as tolerance
levels are adjusted and the interpretations are updated by the user. Continuing with transaction
tx6, lowering all tolerance levels to the lowest setting results in the transaction interpretation
changing from the initial interpretation of 73.640% to the lower 68.991% as shown in Figure 4.9.
It should be noted that the color coding changed with the new interpretation since the value fell
below the 70% boundary.
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Figure 4.9: Detailed Trust Interpretation Display With Lowered Tolerance
4.7 Summary
This chapter has discussed the implementation that demonstrates the trustability assessment
model proposed in Chapter III. AssetTracker meets all of the specifications, it repeatably calculates
trust values, and provides interpretation values that can be adjusted for the amount of allowable
tolerance. Three scenarios are utilized to generate a range of trust values. The results of the
scenarios are discussed and analyzed in Chapter V.
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V. Conclusions and Future Work
Chapter IV discusses and demonstrates the AssetTracker system as a representative example of
how to create and utilize trust values in web services based data exchange. This chapter builds
upon that and discusses the trust values generated by the three different scenarios and conjectures
on their meaning. The success of the implementation to include its usefulness in a decision
making environment is discussed. Finally, several areas for future enhancements to this work are
presented.
5.1 Conclusions
Quality of information plays an increasingly important role in decision making environ-
ments. With this increased reliance comes the need to discriminate between trustable and
untrustable information. The model proposed in this work provides this capability. In order
to maintain a reasonable scope, focus has been limited to the secure communications domain of
web services. When considering the overall effectiveness of the implementation, there are several
areas that must be discussed. First, we examine whether or not the trust values are constructed in a
repeatable way as described in Section 3.4. Second, the usefulness of the trustability assessment in
a decision making environment is analyzed. Finally, the role that the three scenarios from Section
4.6 play in determining the overall utility of the system is discussed.
5.1.1 Repeatable Representation. As depicted in Figure 5.1 our trust values have been
constructed in a repeatable manner. Each of the three scenarios has the same pattern, but different
ranges of interpretation values. This is not a graph representative of the overall system trustability
over time, rather it is a graph showing the individual trustability interpretations for a set of
transactions. All interpretation values are calculated using a normal tolerance; adjustments made
to individual indicator tolerance levels would change the actual plots for each scenario.
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Figure 5.1: Scenario Trust Interpretations Overlaid
Each scenario makes the same method calls (retrieval, addition, update, deletion), on the
same initial state of the database. Repeated execution on the same initial state generates the same
set of trust values every time. It follows that the trust values are the same for each scenario aside
from the differing brackets and source credibility. The bracket and source credibility variations are
what account for each scenario raising or lowering the trust values according to the configuration
as described in Section 4.6.
5.1.2 Usefulness in Decision-Making Environment. The goal of this work is not to prevent
untrustable information from entering the system, but rather to alert decision makers to the
presence of any. Knowledge of the presence of untrustable information allows them to react
appropriately to the decision at hand. Unsecured methods are accessed several times during each
scenario. As seen from the low points in Figure 5.1, the trustability is severely degraded when
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they are accessed, alerting users to the fact that something has legitimately lowered the trust.
A detailed examination of the transaction log will reveal that an unsecure method was invoked.
Further investigation can be made to determine if the unsecured method was intentionally allowed,
if it was mistakenly allowed, or if a malicious user was able to gain unauthorized access to it.
Although the impact of trust assessment values is conveyed visually here, there is a clear
foundation for a machine-based decision making system to process and act upon the values. Due
to the pre-defined format of trust values, each value can be parsed to determine what set of inputs
resulted in its value. Using transaction tx7 from Figure 4.7, we can parse its trust value of 777D60.
Table 5.1 shows how the value is parsed.
Table 5.1: Trust Value Parsing - 777D60
Indicator Value Binary Value Meaning
7 0111 WS-Security Authorization was successfully applied; wide
bracket
7 0111 WS-Security Signature was successfully applied; wide bracket
7 0111 WS-Security Encryption was successfully applied; wide bracket
D 1101 Data was consistent with both alternate sources; medium-narrow
bracket
6 0110 Source credibility is medium-low; medium-wide bracket
0 0000 Actual currency is very current; expected currency is very current
All trust assessment values are parsed the same way. There is a finite set of possible ways that
any given trust value can have been constructed. From this we can see how it is easy to construct
an algorithm that can react appropriately to any trust value. There is nothing that prohibits a dual
approach, where an automated system uses the trust assessments to aid its decision making, and
a human user interface exists alongside allowing views into the trustability of information.
5.1.3 Impact of Bracket Selection and Source Credibility. Scenario Three (see Table 4.6)
has very narrow brackets for the WS-Security indicators, as well as a very low source credibility
rating. The overall trust value interpretations are lower than the other scenarios as expected. The
narrowing of brackets has the effect of decreasing the overall trustability for the service instance.
Scenario Two reverses that trend by using very wide brackets, and a high source credibility rating.
61
Figure 5.2 shows trust interpretations from each scenario in consecutive order (Scenario One,
Scenario Two, Scenario Three). Since the methods executed are the same, and occur in the same
order for each scenario, we can see that the transaction trust assessments are increased or decreased
in proportion to the value of the brackets and source credibility. As expected, Scenario One (having
medium brackets and source credibility values) generated interpretations greater than Scenario
Three, but less than Scenario Two.
Figure 5.2: Scenario Trust Interpretations Consecutively
5.2 Future Work
As shown in Chapter II, there is significant interest throughout the literature and industry in
assessing trustability of information. As discussed in the previous section, the model and method-
ology proposed in this work attempts to provide improvements over existing trust assessment
models. Despite the progress of the present work, there are additional features that could further
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enhance the value provided in a decision making environment. These potential enhancements are
outlined and reviewed here.
5.2.1 Multiple Clients. As detailed in Chapter IV, the trust values generated in this work
use a single client instance with differing bracket and source credibility scenarios. While this
provides a broad range of trust values, an enhanced implementation could use multiple client
instances. In addition to providing the same insight as the approach of this work, multiple clients
allow for the notion of seeing how other service instances rate each others trustability. Of particular
interest when assessing Data Consistency and Source Credibility, it would be interesting to see
how each instance rates the consistency and credibility of other sources, in effect building up
a default trust bias. For example, if ForwardWS generates a Data Consistency value indicating
the data is consistent among all sources for a transaction involving aircraft a3, will RearWS and
HomeWS generate the same value? Implications of these differences on the decision maker could
be explored.
5.2.2 Database Replication. The initial data used for this implementation is similar across
all service instances with the exception of some minor differences introduced to obtain a range of
trustability assessments. Data is not explicitly replicated from one database to another. If multiple
clients are used, unless they are configured to initiate similar transactions (i.e. exact replications)
for each service instance, the databases will only increase in their differences. This guarantees that
Data Consistency values will decrease as transactions continue to occur. Data replication would
solve this problem, increasing the usefulness of the trust assessments.
5.2.3 Distributed System Integration. The AssetTracker system was built specifically to
demonstrate the model proposed in Chapter III. While it serves that purpose well, the true test
of the present works’ trust assessment methodology is how well it would function in a real world
system. Much in the same way that AssetTracker is able to calculate trustability assessments, any
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SOAP web service environment should be able to accommodate a set of trustability extensions.
Real world data and a sizable transaction load would provide insight into the effectiveness of
this work. The Joint Battle Infosphere from the Air Force Research Laboratory would be a good
platform to investigate for this integration as they are in the process of moving to a web services
based platform.
5.2.4 Transaction Log Data Mining. We have limited our use of the transaction log to
merely gather trust assessment values and calculate interpretations. Despite this self imposed
restriction, there is a wealth of information that can be gleaned. Logs can be searched for unusual
patterns in method access, e.g. an extraordinarily large amount of invocations for a particular
object. These (and other) anomalies could be correlated to the resulting trust values. The effect
that certain method invocations have on trust values could be determined from the logs, perhaps
giving additional insight into the overall information trustability.
5.3 Summary
This work addresses the issues that exist in assessing information trustability. The proposed
solution is framed in a secure web services environment, and uses a series of indicators and
attributes to derive trust values for information from web service transactions. The values are
constructed in a repeatable manner such that the value can be parsed by humans or machines to
determine its meaning. Assessment values are translated to a percentage-based interpretation that
enhances the the ability of the decision maker to determine the basis for confidence in presented
information.
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Appendix A. Key Algorithms
This appendix contains the full algorithms in pseudo-code for calculating Data Currency and Data
Consistency indicators. Algorithm A.1 contains the Data Currency algorithm, and is discussed in
Section 3.4.5. Algorithm A.2 contains the Data Consistency algorithm and is discussed in Section
3.4.3.
Algorithm A.1 Determining Data Currency
1: if actualCurrency == "00" then
2: interpretation = 100
3: else if actualCurrency == "01" then
4: if expectedCurrency == "00" then
5: interpretation = (100/3) * 2 = 66.66
6: else
7: interpretation = 100
8: end if
9: else if actualCurrency == "10" then
10: if expectedCurrency == "00" then
11: interpretation = (100/3) = 33.33
12: else if expectedCurrency == "01" then
13: interpretation = (100/3) * 2 = 66.66
14: else
15: interpretation = 100
16: end if
17: else if actualCurrency == "11" then
18: if expectedCurrency == "00" then
19: interpretation = 0
20: else if expectedCurrency == "01" then
21: interpretation = (100/3) = 33.33
22: else if expectedCurrency == "10" then
23: interpretation = (100/3) * 2 = 66.66
24: else
25: interpretation = 100
26: end if
27: end if
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Algorithm A.2 Determining Data Consistency
1: if message reaches Handler then
2: get methodName being invoked /* from transaction log */
3: get method input /* from transaction log */
4: if methodName starts with "get" then
5: for all datatypes do
6: SELECT * FROM alternateSource1 WHERE id = inputID
7: for all query results do
8: if all attributes match then
9: Consistency += "1"
10: else
11: Consistency += "0"
12: end if
13: SELECT * FROM alternateSource2 WHERE id = inputID
14: if all attributes match then
15: Consistency += "1"
16: else
17: Consistency += "0"
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: else if methodName starts with "add" or "update" then
22: for all datatypes do
23: SELECT * FROM alternateSource1 WHERE allAttributes = allInputAttributes
24: if all attributes match then
25: Consistency += "1"
26: else
27: Consistency += "0"
28: end if
29: SELECT * FROM alternateSource2 WHERE allAttributes = allInputAttributes
30: if all attributes match then
31: Consistency += "1"
32: else
33: Consistency += "0"
34: end if
35: end for
36: else if methodName starts with "delete" then
37: for all datatypes do
38: SELECT * FROM alternateSource1 WHERE id = inputID
39: if there are no results then /* deleted data does not exist */
40: Consistency += "1"
41: else
42: Consistency += "0"
43: end if
44: SELECT * FROM alternateSource2 WHERE id = inputID
45: if there are no results then /* deleted data does not exist */
46: Consistency += "1"
47: else
48: Consistency += "0"
49: end if
50: end for
51: end if
52: end if
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Appendix B. SQL DDL Descriptions
This contains the SQL DDL descriptions for each AssetTracker database table.
Table B.1: MAJCOM SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
majcom_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) ID for the MAJCOM
majcom_name VARCHAR(40) Name of the MAJCOM
Table B.2: Base SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
base_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) ID for the base
majcom_id (foreign key) VARCHAR(10) ID of the parent MAJCOM
base_name VARCHAR(25) Name of the base
Table B.3: Aircraft SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
aircraft_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) ID of the aircraft
base_id (foreign key) VARCHAR(10) ID of the parent base
model VARCHAR(20) Model of the aircraft (e.g. F-16)
status VARCHAR(20) Status of the aircraft
Table B.4: Munition SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
munition_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) ID of the munition
base_id (foreign key) VARCHAR(10) ID of the parent base
name VARCHAR(20) Name of the type of munition
status VARCHAR(20) Status of the munition
Table B.5: Personnel SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
personnel_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) ID of the personnel
base_id (foreign key) VARCHAR(10) ID of the parent base
title VARCHAR(20) Title of the personnel
status VARCHAR(20) Status of the personnel
Table B.6: clientProfile SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
client_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) ID tag for the client (e.g. Forward)
w_wssSig VARCHAR(2) Bracket for WS-Security Signature
w_wssEnc VARCHAR(2) Bracket for WS-Security Encryption
w_wssAuth VARCHAR(2) Bracket for WS-Security Authorization
w_dataCons VARCHAR(2) Bracket for Data Consistency
w_srcCred VARCHAR(2) Bracket for Source Credibility
w_dataCurr VARCHAR(2) Bracket for Data Currency
w_actSrcCred VARCHAR(2) Source Credibility rating for the source
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Table B.7: expectedCurrency SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
cr_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) Currency table ID
dataType VARCHAR(20) Data type for currency value
expCurr VARCHAR(2) Expected currency for data type
Table B.8: txLog SQL DDL Description
Fieldname SQL Type Description
tx_id (primary key) VARCHAR(10) Transaction ID
timestamp VARCHAR(15) Timestamp of the message
srvBodyID VARCHAR(45) Body ID of the message being logged
methodName VARCHAR(20) Name of method invoked
inputStr VARCHAR(255) Comma delimited list of method input parameters
outputStr TEXT Output returned by the invoked method
t_wssSig VARCHAR(2) Trust value for WS-Security Signature
t_wssEnc VARCHAR(2) Trust value for WS-Security Encryption
t_wssAuth VARCHAR(2) Trust value for WS-Security Authorization
t_dataCons VARCHAR(2) Trust value for Data Consistency
t_srcCred VARCHAR(2) Trust value for Source Credibility
t_dataCurr VARCHAR(2) Trust value for Data Currency
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